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THE EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT SIZE ON ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
ON A GROUP OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
USING A PANEL DATA APPROACH 
Tayseer Al-Sumadi and Basudeb Biswas 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the effect of government size, measured by the ratio of government 
consumption expenditures to gross domestic product, GDP, on the rate of growth of per capita 
GDP. Our sample includes 30 low-income and middle-income developing countries over the 
period 1970-90. We use a panel data approach to avoid the shortcomings of the cross-country 
models often used in such an analysis. The results indicate government size has a highly 
significant negative influence on the rate of economic growth. 
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USING A PANEL DATA APPROACH 
1. Introduction 
1 
The heated debate about the extent of the government role in economic activities IS 
nothing new in the economic literature. In the sixteenth century, the mercantilist school 
advocates "favored a strong central government to enforce the regulation of business" (Oser and 
Blanchfield, 1975, p. 11). At that time, the government played a vital role in the economy and 
adopted different policies of intervention, which included granting monopoly privileges, 
imposing restrictions to limit competition, and providing subsidies to different economic sectors. 
The eighteenth century witnessed the rise of the classical school following the pioneering 
work of Adam Smith. The first and foremost principle of this school was laissez fair, which 
claims "[t]hat government is best which governs least" (Oser and Blanchfield, 1975, p. 44). The 
proponents of this free-enterprise economic theory argued the market is the right mechanism for 
efficient allocation of resources. Therefore, the government role in economy should be limited to 
the provision of public goods and services the private sector cannot or does not desire to provide. 
These include national defense, maintenance of law and order, and basic infrastructures such as 
railroads, ports, and dams. 
The issue of government intervention took a new tum in the beginning of the nineteenth 
century after the emergence of Marxist socialism. This school took the opposite extreme of the 
classical school by introducing the idea of entrepreneurial government and favoring large-scale 
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government intervention in the economy. The protagonists of this school argued the market 
efficiency is attained under a set of unrealistic conditions, such as perfect competition and perfect 
information, and in the absence of these conditions the market is doomed to fail, which creates a 
prima facie for government intervention. 
After World War II, the governments of developed and developing countries played a 
vital role in economic activities. In the developed world, the birthplace of free-market theories, 
government intervention came about as a result of the infrastructure destruction in the aftermath 
of the war. In the developing countries, the governments assumed the central role in the economy 
to build and develop the poor infrastructure. Most of the developing countries were under 
colonial rule, which was unfavorable to local entrepreneurs and hence did not encourage private 
investment. The legacy of the colonial era, coupled with the example of the Soviet model, 
resulted in a greater participation by the state in economic development. 
Government intervention in these countries went beyond the traditional role when the 
public sector created many public enterprises engaged in industrial production in pursuing the 
impoli-substituting-industrialization policies. The expansion of the public sector encouraged 
rent-seeking activities at the expense of profit-seeking activities. 
The oil crisis in 1979 and the external debt crises in the 1980s pointed to harmful effects 
of government-led policies. Moreover, the poor performance of public enterprises in developing 
countries over the last three decades highlighted the negative role of the government in the 
functioning of the economy. Since then, it was proven that pervasive government intervention 
contributed negatively to the overall economic performance. 
The retrenchment of the developmental state paradigm and the sweeping privatization 
triggered an overwhelming research attempting to investigate the effects of government size on 
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economic and social welfare. In the absence of a clear-cut economic theory framework in this 
area, in addition to some other factors to be explained later, this research came with conflicting 
results. This paper aims to investigate the effect of government size on economic growth and to 
investigate whether privatization is the panacea for the economic problems plaguing developing 
countries. Our research departs from the vast majority of the received empirical literature in the 
following ways: First, we use a panel data approach to study the effect of government size, in 
lieu of a cross-country approach. Second, we provide overwhelming empirical evidence about 
the effect of privatization in the countries implementing this policy. Finally, we use the most 
recent data provided by Heston and Summers (1995). 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical 
explanation of the secular growth of government size over time. Section 3 contains a review of 
the empirical literature. Section 4 sheds light on the government role in the economies of some 
Asian countries, i.e., the East Asian Miracle. The theoretical model is discussed in Section 5. 
The data set and the empirical estimations are discussed in Section 6. We end up with 
concluding remarks in Section 7. 
2. The Growth of Government Size 
The secular growth of government spurred economists to investigate the reasons behind 
the growth of the government size. Consequently, many theories have been put forward to 
explain the growth of the public sector. These theories include a wide rage of explanations, 
including social, political, and economic factors. We provide a cursory review of some of widely 
prevalent theories in explaining the growth of government size: 
J 
4 
Wagner's Law 
One of the hypotheses aiming at explaining the secular growth of the government size is 
what IS called Wagner's law, which was introduced by Adolph Wagner in late nineteenth 
century. This hypothesis states that the income elasticity of demand for goods and services 
provided by the government is greater than unity. The government size is expected to increase as 
the level of per capita GDP increases.! This hypothesis failed to specify the stage of 
development in which this relationship is expected to occur. Moreover, it does not identify the 
pattern of change of particular components of government expenditures (Afxentiou, 1982). 
The empirical test of this hypothesis yielded mixed results. Easterly and Rebelo (1993) 
found some support for Wagner's law while 10ulfaian and Marlow (1991) confirmed this 
hypothesis in the U.S. economy. Lin (1994) found evidence that this hypothesis was true only in 
developed countries. Ram (1987) found that while time-series models provide support for this 
hypothesis, the cross-sectional models do not. Ferris and West (1996), however, failed to confirm 
this hypothesis. 
Public Choice Hypotheses 
Some of the main functions of the government are to provide public goods and 
services as well as to eliminate, or at least mitigate, externalities. Based on this argument, some 
public choice hypotheses tend to explain the growth of the public sector. Median voter theorem 
and the interest group hypothesis are eminent among these hypotheses. The first one suggests the 
government opts to target certain groups of people (e.g., poor people, farmers, and urban 
population) who might possess noticeable voting power. To gain their votes, the government 
! See the appendix for the micro economic foundation of this hypothesis. 
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might introduce some distributional measures to improve the welfare of these groups at the 
expense of others who do not have the same voting power. This theorem is more applicable to 
the democratic countries where the elections are held on a regularly basis to determine who will 
govern the country. The local and national governments in these countries tend to increase their 
expenditures by providing more goods and services (e.g., police, education, and transportation 
services) to satisfy the needs of the targeted people. This results in larger government with more 
public goods and services provided. 
The interest group hypothesis explains the growth of government through the existence of 
special interest groups who put pressures on the government to introduce some activities 
designed to reduce the transaction costs borne by these groups. These groups could include the 
govelnment employees who might have discretionary power to achieve their own interests at the 
expense of the citizens (Mueller, 1987). When the new activities are introduced, it becomes 
difficult to reduce or eliminate them in the future, which leads to secular growth in the size of the 
government. The empirical evidence of Ferris and West (1996) provides some evidence in 
support of these hypotheses. 
Baumol's Effect 
The government sector is typically labor intensive since employment is one of the 
socioeconomic goals for any government. The growth of productivity is mostly embodied in 
technological change. Baumol's effect or Baumol's cost disease argues that service sectors, 
which are highly labor intensive, lag other sectors in productivity growth. Because of that, the 
cost of providing public goods and services will increase more quickly than for private goods. 
This causes prices of government goods and services to increase over time. Consequently, the 
share of government activities in GDP will also increase over time. 
J 
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This hypothesis is based on the argument that the price elasticity of demand for goods and 
services provided by the public sector is less than unity.2 Mueller (1987) found that Baumol's 
effect explains 25% of the increase in government size for the average Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) country. Ferris and West (1996) reported 
empirical results which lend support to this hypothesis. 
Fiscal Illusion Hypothesis 
This hypothesis assumes that the citizens measure the size of government by the size of 
their tax bill. If the tax burden can be disguised then citizens cannot measure the true size of 
government, which can grow beyond the levels they tolerate (Mueller, 1987). Kneebone (1992) 
found support for the existence of fiscal illusion in the Canadian economy. Oates (1985) reported 
the following five sources of this illusion: 
Complexity of the tax structure. This means the more complex the government revenue 
systelTI, the more difficult for the voters to estimate the actual tax -price they pay for public goods 
and services. 
Renter illusion. This occurs because the property tax is not paid by the tenants but by the 
owners, who tend to pass this tax to the renters in the form of high rents. This makes the tenants 
fail to link the size of government spending to their rent payment. 
Income elasticity of the revenue system. This suggests people do not care about their tax 
bill but about their tax rate. Therefore, in booming times when the income level increases, the 
government levies more revenues and its size grows. 
Debt illusion. In this case it is assumed the citizens care if the government projects are 
financed through taxation, but they do not care if these projects are financed by government 
2See the appendix for the micro economic foundation of this hypothesis. 
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borrowing. Therefore, they fail to estimate the cost they bear as a result of this borrowing. This 
means reliance on borrowing rather than taxation to finance public projects results in larger 
government. 
The flypaper effect. This means that the government officials can use the lump-sum 
intergovernmental grants to convince the voters that there is a decrease in tax rates needed to 
finance different government programs (Oates, 1985). Therefore, Oates (1985, pp. 23-24) defines 
the flypaper effect as the existence of "a significantly higher propensity for recipients to increase 
public expenditure in response to the lump-sum intergovernmental grants than in response to 
equivalent increase in private income." 
Political, Social, and Economic Ideology 
As nlentioned at the outset, many economic schools have arisen in the last few centuries. 
These schools have had different, political social, as well as economic backgrounds and 
implications. Consequently, the size of the government varied substantially depending on the 
ideologies prevailing in the subject countries. Government size was noticeably large in the 
countries that imbued with the socialist paradigm (e.g., former Soviet Union and East Europe). 
On the contrary, the government size in western countries, where the laissez faire dichotomy 
prevailed, was smaller with a large private sector taking the economic lead. 
Displacement Effect 
The displacement effect hypothesis states the tax burden can increase when the taxpayers 
believe that the increase is justified. For example, during war, depression, or other national 
crises, the government involvement is expected to increase, so "an otherwise intolerable tax 
burden may become acceptable" (Kneebone, 1992, p. 1297). However, because of the expanded 
J 
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bureaucracy and the concentration of power at the national level, the new situation, i.e., the 
higher tax burden, is expected to continue even after the crisis passed (Slemrod, 1995). 
3. Literature Review 
In the last two decades, ample research about the effect of government involvement in 
economic activities on economic growth has taken place. Given the difficulties in assessing the 
real scale of government involvement, different proxies for this variable were employed, 
including the size of govermnent consumption expenditure, government tax revenue, and the 
ratio of public enterprises output to national output. This research resulted in conflicting results 
with respect to the relationship between the government size and the rate of economic growth. 
The conflicting results can be attributed to factors such as using different proxies for government 
size, applying different proxies for the growth rate, using a sample of different countries at 
different time periods, and using different ad hoc models in the absence of theoretical framework 
to investigate the effect of government involvement as well as the process of economic growth. 
Many factors triggered the wide research in these areas such as the sharp macroeconomic 
imbalances of most countries, particularly in the developing world, the collapse of the command 
economies, and the availability of worldwide comprehensive data. 
Using cross-sectional data on 43 developed and underdeveloped countries from 1955-70, 
Rubinson (1977) concluded there was a positive relationship between the government size, 
measured by the ratio of government revenue to gross national product, GNP, and economic 
growth. Employing cross-section data of 46 countries, Kormendi and Meguire (1985) found a 
positive, but statistically insignificant, relationship between economic growth and the size of 
government, indexed by government consumption as a ratio of GNP. Conte and Darrat (1988) 
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employed time-series data on all OECD countries from 1960-84. Their results indicated public 
sector expansion, indexed by total government outlays as a ratio of GDP, is not generally 
accountable for retarding economic growth in OECD countries. Using government consumption 
spending as an index of government size and covering 130 countries from 1960-85, Lin (1994) 
used cross-country single and simultaneous equation models to find government size had a 
positive impact on economic growth in the short run, but not in the intermediate one (25 years in 
his study). 
Ram (1986) used cross-sectional as well as time-series data on 115 developed and 
developing countries employing a two-sector, government and nongovernment, production 
function framework based on Feder's (1982) paper. He found a positive and highly significant 
relationship between government size and economic growth. Ram's (1989) later analysis resulted 
in a similar outcome. Employing the Denison growth accounting approach on cross-sectional 
data of 42 developing countries, Diamond (1989) found a positive, but insignificant, relationship 
between the economic growth rate and the overall size of government, measured by the ratio of 
total government expenditures to GDP. When the structure of these expenditures was examined, 
he concluded social government expenditures on housing, health, and welfare exerted a positive 
significant effect on growth in the short run, while capital infrastructure expenditure had little 
influence on growth. On the other hand, he concluded that directly productive capital expenditure 
exerted a negative influence on economic growth. 
Landau (1983) used cross-sectional data covering 96 countries and found that government 
size, measured by the share of government consumption to GDP, made a negative contribution to 
economic growth. In a more comprehensive and detailed study, Landau (1986) found consistent 
results. He used pooled cross-section and time-series data on 65 developing countries from 1960-
J 
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80. When the government expenditure was categorized, he found that government capital 
expenditure was slightly harmful to economic growth. 
Barro (1989) employed an endogenous growth model on cross-sectional data covering 98 
countries from 1960-85, finding the size of government, proxied by the ratio of government 
consumption spending, excluding defense and education, to GDP has a negative impact on the 
economic growth. Barro (1991) employed an endogenous growth model on cross-sectional data 
covering 72 countries from 1960-85, finding the size of government, measured by the ratio of 
government consumption spending, excluding defense and education, to GDP has a negative 
impact not only on the economic growth but also on the investment ratio, i.e., the ratio of public 
and private investment to GDP. 
Grier and Tullock (1989) employed pooled cross-section data on 113 countries over the 
period 1950-81, and found a negative correlation between government size, measured by 
government consumption expenditures to GDP, and the rate of economic growth. In a sample of 
107 countries during the period from 1970-85, Engen and Skinner (1992) used a generalized 
production function approach assuming a two-sector model, taxed and untaxed, economy. They 
found government spending and taxation were negatively associated with economic growth. 
Using a sample of 79 developed and developing countries, Sachs and Warner (1995) found a 
negative relationship between the growth rate and the ratio of real government consumption 
spending, net of military and education spending, to real GDP. 
Miller (1996) employed data on 22 aCED countries from 1960-88 using time-series and 
pooled cross-section models and found the share of real government public expenditures in GDP 
may not affect the real economic growth, while the increase in this share may have a negative 
impact on the rate of economic growth. Employing a fixed effect model on a sample of 59 
/ 
11 
middle-income developing countries over the period 1960-85, Guseh (1997) found a negative 
relationship between the government size, indexed by the share of government consumption 
expenditure in GDP, and the rate of economic growth. 
Easterly and Rebelo (1993) followed Barro's (1991) cross-country regressIon and 
reported a negative relationship between the growth rate and the government size, measured as 
the ratio of tax revenue to GDP. However, they indicated this result was fragile. In their study of 
sensitivity analysis of cross-country growth regressions, Levine and Renelt (1992) employed 
different scenarios to investigate the relationship between government size and the rate of 
economic growth. First, they used cross-sectional data on 64 countries and found a negative 
relationship between the ratio of government consumption expenditures to GDP and growth rate. 
Second, they used total government expenditures to GDP. Third, they used government 
consumption share minus defense and educational expenditures. Finally, they used central 
government surplus/deficit to GDP. All the results were negative, albeit not robust. Using a 
model based on conventional demand theory framework and using time-series data on 20 African 
countries from 1960-85, Bairam (1990) argued whether the size of government, indexed by the 
size of total government expenditure, has positive or negative effects on economic growth is 
country specific and therefore cannot be generalized. 
4. East Asian Miracle and Government 
Intervention 
One of the most controversial issues in the economic literature on economic growth and 
the role of government in the economic activities centers on what is known as the East Asian 
Miracle. Eight east Asian countries, including China, Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, South Korea, Thailand, and Taiwan, recorded a spectacular rate of rapid and sustained 
12 
economic growth over the last three decades. These high-performing Asian economies (HP AB) 
outperformed the OEeD economies. 
The high rates of sustained economic growth in these countries cast more doubt on the 
validity of the neoclassical growth theory. This theory is based on the exogeniety of the saving 
ratio and population growth and it assumes diminishing marginal productivity of inputs. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that technology, which is exogenous, is the only factor to account for 
economic growth. Given these assumptions, the theory predicts the developing countries will 
achieve higher rates of economic growth than developed countries for a certain period of time. 
Due to the assumed diminishing returns, however, the rates of economic growth in the 
developing countries are expected to converge to a steady state. 
In the case of the East Asian Miracle, the convergence expected in the neoclassical theory 
did not exist. The celebrated work of Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) introduced what is known 
as endogenous growth theory. This theory assumes that technological change is endogenous and 
emphasizes the importance of human capital and the accumulation of knowledge as important 
factors in the economic growth process. These factors are not subj ect to a diminishing return to 
scale, and the convergence, as the theory argues, is not necessary and the rates of economic 
growth are related over time. 
There is no consensus among the economists about the determinants of high economic 
growth in the HP AB. An array of explanations has been introduced including cultural, religious, 
regional, and economic factors. Nonetheless, the range and the effect of government 
interventions with respect to this outstanding performance has not been settled yet. The governed 
market theory, which is sometimes called the structuralist or revisionist school (e.g., Wade, 
1990), argues this experience lends support to the state-led growth policies and emphasizes the 
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impoliance of government intervention in achieving high rates of economic growth. Not only 
this, but this theory argues the governments in these countries deliberately got the prices wrong 
to affect the incentive system in favor of the industrial sector. 
Free market theory (e.g., Chen, 1979), which is imbued with the principles of the 
neoclassical theory, argues the state intervention in the HP AE was largely absent and the startling 
performance of these economies was based on a market-led environment. There is also a group 
of economists who argue that government intervention in these countries had negative impacts on 
economic growth, which could have been larger in the absence of government intervention (see 
Krueger, 1995). 
Furthermore, there is a simulated free market theory or market friendly theory (e.g., 
World Bank, 1991; 1993) which recognizes the government intervention and believes this 
intervention was wider than the creation of the suitable growth environment. This theory argues 
the governments in these countries were simulating the free market. 
The World Bank (1993) acknowledges the importance of the systematic government 
intervention in these economies while emphasizing that these economies got the fundamentals 
right. These fundamentals include low level of inflation, realistic exchange rates, building human 
capital by giving much attention to the educational and training systems, creating effective and 
secure financial systems, implementing successful technological catch-up, limiting the price 
distortions, and limiting the bias against the agricultural sector. These economies adopted 
outward-oriented policies, achieved egalitarian distribution of income, and encouraged or forced 
high levels of domestic saving, which led to high levels of domestic investments. 
/ 
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5. Theoretical Modeling 
As indicated earlier, the vast majority of empirical studies used cross-country models to 
investigate the effect of government size on economic growth. However, these models suffer 
from the following shortcomings. First, different countries have different specific effects. 
Nonetheless, cross-country models ignore this fact and treat all countries as having the same 
characteristics. If the country-specific effects are correlated with the explanatory variables, there 
will be what is known as the omitted variable bias. Second, some variables might be time variant, 
but the time factor is ignored in cross-country models. Third, cross-section data provide few 
observations, which negatively affects the efficiency of econometric estimates. Because of the 
aforelnentioned shortcomings, the validity of cross-country studies is cast in doubt. In addition, 
Levine and Zervos (1993, pp. 426-427) argue that "cross-country regressions should be viewed 
as evaluating the strength of partial correlation and not as behavioral relationship that suggest 
how much growth will change when policies change." 
Panel data models avoid these shortcomings for the following reasons. First, they 
accommodate across-country and across-time differences. Second, they provide a large number 
of data points, which increases the degrees of freedom and improves the efficiency of the 
econometric estimates by reducing the collinearity among the explanatory variables. Therefore, 
in our study, we employ the following theoretical econometric model using panel data to 
investigate the relationship between the government size and the rate of growth or" per capita 
Income: 
~t = AXit , ! + AXit ,2 + .... ·+AXit ,k + ~t (1= 1,2, .... ,N; t= 1,2, .... ,1). (1) 
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That is, the sample data are represented by observations on N cross-section units over T time 
periods. Yit is the independent variable for the ith country in the tth time period. Xi! are 
explanatory variables, B's are parameters to be estimated, and 0. is the stochastic disturbance. 
In the classical linear regression model (CLRM), it is assumed the error term, which 
includes the effect of unobserved variables, is independently distributed from the explanatory 
variables. However, in the case of panel data, the omitted variables can be classified into three 
groups: (1) time-varying country-invariant, (2) country-varying time-invariant, and (3) country 
and time-varying variables. If these variables are correlated with the explanatory variables, the 
CLRM estimation yields biased estimates of ;is. 
Therefore, when panel data are employed, equation 1 can be estimated employing two 
different approaches, depending on whether the unobserved effects are assumed to be correlated 
or uncorrelated with the explanatory variables included in the model. These approaches are 
incorporated in the fixed effect model and the random effect model. 
Fixed Effect Mode 
This approach assumes individual effects are fixed in nature (Islam, 1995) and 
uncorrelated with the error term and are treated as fixed parameters. If the problem is that the 
omitted time-varying or country-varying variables are correlated with the error term, the problem 
can be solved by adjusting the dependent and independent variables through transformation from 
individual means. Using this approach, equation 1 can be written as follows: 
(2) 
where ~'s are individual specific constants, D/ s are group dummy variables, and E is the classical 
stochastic disturbance with mean zero and variance (T/. 
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This model is estimated by using the least square dummy variable (LSDV) method and is 
based on the assumption that only the intercept parameter varies and this variation occurs across 
countries, but not over time. Hence all behavior differences between individual countries and 
over time are captured by the intercept (Griffiths et al., 1993). Therefore, Equation 2 can be 
simplified as follows: 
(3) 
However, this model is not without caveats. First of all, if the employed sample is drawn 
from a large population, it is unreasonable to assume that differences between countries are 
nothing but parametric shifts. Second, the estimation results of this model cannot be generalized 
on countries out of the sample. Third, in case of correlation of both time-varying country-varying 
effects with the explanatory variables, this model cannot be estimated. 
Random Effect Model 
As mentioned earlier, the fixed effect model cannot be used when the omitted variables 
are time and country-varying. In this case the random effect model is the appropriate method. 
This model is suitable when the countries included in the sample have been chosen randomly to 
represent larger population. Consequently, this model deals with the individual effects as random 
variables. The error term has three components, time-specific effect (Wt), country-specific effect 
(Vi), and time and country-specific effect (~it). These effects are assumed to be independent of the 
regressors. The error term can be written as follows (Kmenta, 1986; Greene, 1992; Miller, 1996; 
Miller and Russek, 1997): 
(i=1,2, ..... ,N; t=1,2, ..... ,1) (4) 
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Further, it is assumed the error term has the following properties (Kmenta, 1986; Greene, 
1992; Miller, 1996; Miller and Russek, 1997): 
E(Vi Vj)=a} , l7 i=j ; 0 otherwise 
E(~it~js)=CTJL2, l7 i=j and t=s ; 0 otherwise (5) 
These implications imply Cit is homoscedastic with the following variance: 
(6) 
Substituting equation 4 into equation 1: 
(7) 
If the components of the error term are known, this model can be estimated uSIng / 
generalized least square (GLS). However, if these components are unknown, the model should be 
estimated using feasible generalized least square (FGLS). 
6. Data Set and Empirical Estimation 
The Data Set 
The study employs a panel data set of 30 developing countries over the period 1970-90. 
Of these countries, 15 are low-income countries and 15 are middle-income countries. The 
countries were classified based on the World Bank classification by level of income in 1992-93. 
The countries included in the study are listed in table 1. Figure 1 shows the secular growth of 
government size in these countries, measured by government consumption to GDP, over the 
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study period. It is apparent that government size recorded sustained growth during the last three 
decades. 
The primary source of our data set is Heston and Summers (1995). Other sources include 
the International Monetary Fund (1988) and the World Bank (1992, 1993, and 1996). 
As Inentioned earlier, the economic theory does not provide a clear framework to 
estimate the relationship between government size and economic growth and there is no 
consensus among the economists about a given framework to investigate this issue. Different 
approaches and various sets of dependent and explanatory variables have been employed in the 
existing empirical literature without proving the superiority of a particular one over the others. 
Levine and Renelt (1992, p. 942) indicated "that over 50 variables have been found significantly 
correlated with growth in at least one regression." 
Based on what can be deduced from the economic theory and the existing empirical 
literature, our empirical model will have the following ad hoc formulation: 
(8) 
where y is the growth rate of per capita income, Govt is the size of government proxied by the 
share of government consumption expenditures in GDP, Inv is the investment share, public plus 
private investment, of GDP, Opn is an indicator of the economy openness measured by the ratio 
of exports plus imports to GDP, Pop is the annual growth rate of population, CAd is the ratio of 
current account deficit, before official transfers, to GDP, and Extd is the ratio of total external 
debt, private and public, to GDP. u, p, 8, y, A, ~, and 8 are coefficients to be estimated and E is 
the stochastic disturbance term. 
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Set of Hypotheses 
Through the estimation of this model, the following hypotheses will be tested: Hypothesis 
1: There is a negative relationship between government size and economic growth, i.e., jJ has a 
negative sign. This hypothesized relationship is attributed to the inefficiency of the public sector, 
the crowding out effect of government expenditure, the price distortion because of government 
policies, and the deterioration in saving rates as a result of government budget deficits. 
Hypothesis 2: Public and private investment exerts positive influence on economic growth, i.e., 
the predicted sign of c5 is positive. This is attributed to the investment role in capital accumulation 
which is vital for economic growth. It is noteworthy here that Levine and Renelt (1992) indicated 
that the investment rate was found to be one of the most robust variables in the economic growth 
emplf1Cs. 
Hypothesis 3: The open economies experience a high and positive rate of economic growth, i.e., 
the hypothesized sign of y is positive. The positive sign is due to the effect of trade openness on 
specialization, efficient resource allocation, economies of scale, and technological improvement. 
Hypothesis 4: There is not an a priori relationship between the rate of economic growth and 
population growth rate, i.e., the sign of A is unknown. The difficulty in predicting this sign has 
theoretical, as well as empirical roots. In the neoclassical growth theory there should be one-for-
one effect of p·opulation growth on rate of economic growth if all countries are in a steady state 
of economic growth (Kormendi and Meguire, 1985). However, we do not have any prediction 
about the stage of the steady state in our sample of developing countries. Moreover, no 
significant correlation was found between the two variables over the last century in those 
countries now considered as developed (Simon, 1976). 
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Hypothesis 5: There is a negative relationship between the current account deficit and economic 
growth, i.e., ¢ has a negative sign. This is attributed to the negative contribution of this deficit to 
the country foreign reserve, budget deficit, and vulnerability to the external shocks. 
Hypothesis 6: The higher the ratio of external debt to GDP, the lower the level of economic 
growth, i. e., the sign of B is hypothesized to be negative. This is due to the effects of the external 
debt on exchange rate, state independence, and capital outflows. 
Of course these hypotheses will be tested against the simple null hypothesis that no 
relationship exists between economic growth and each one of these macroeconomic variables. 
The Empirical Estimation 
First of all, we have conducted different specification tests to choose the most plausible 
model for our empirical estimation. The F-test was performed to compare the performance of the 
fixed effect model versus the OLS model, which is the null hypothesis. The Lagrange multiplier 
(LM) test was conducted to test the random effect model against the OLS model, which is the 
null hypothesis. The Wald test was performed to compare the performance of the fixed effect 
model against the random effect model, which is the null hypothesis. 
The result of the F-test was in favor of the fixed effect model. Moreover, the LM test led to 
rejection of the random effect model, and the Wald test indicated the superiority of the fixed 
effect model against the random effect model. Therefore, the fixed effect model dominates the 
random effect model and the OLS model. However, the empirical results of the OLS, random 
effect, and fixed effect models are presented in table 2. 
It is evident the coefficient of the government size variable is negative and statistically 
significant at less than 50/0 level of significance. This purports that the larger the government size, 
the lower the rate of economic growth. Figure 2 plots the economic growth rate against the 
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government SIze for the whole sample. Apparently the simple correlation between the two 
variables is strongly negative. 
The empirical results indicate there is a negative relationship between the economIC 
growth rate and the current account deficit. However, this relationship is insignificantly different 
from zero. Figure 3, which shows the simple correlation between the current account deficit and 
the rate of economic growth, reflects an ambiguous relationship. It seems our hypothesis 
regarding the negative relationship between the ratio of external debt to GDP is not supported by 
the empirical estimation. The coefficient of the external debt ratio to GDP is negative but 
statistically insignificant. Furthermore, figure 4, which shows the simple correlation between the 
two variables, reveals the absence of any clear cut relationship between the two variables. 
As indicated earlier, the investment rate was found to be one of the most robust variables 
of the economic growth empirics. This has been confirmed in our study, which shows a highly 
significant positive relationship between the rate of investment and the rate of economic growth. 
The strongly positive simple correlation between the two variables, as shown in figure 5, 
supports this result. The influence of trade openness on economic growth is found to be positive, 
but statistically insignificant. Nonetheless, figure 6 purports a positive simple correlation 
between the two variables. Lastly, the population growth is found to exert a negative and highly 
significant influence on the rate of economic growth. The coefficient of this variable is negative 
and statistically significant at less than 1 % level of significance. In addition to that, when the two 
variables are plotted against each other in figure 7, the negative simple correlation between the 
two variables is vividly captured. This negative relationship can be attributed to different factors 
such as the increase in the dependency ratio and the trade off between the quality and quantity of 
human capital. 
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7. Conclusions 
In this essay, we have employed a panel data approach to investigate the relationship 
between government size and economic performance in terms of economic growth. Different 
specification tests have been conducted to choose the most appropriate model for our empirical 
investigation. The fixed effect model proved to be the most plausible one. The results of this 
model lend support to the argument that the larger the government size, the worse the economic 
performance. 
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Table 1. Developing countries included in the study 
Country Country Code 1 Country Region 
Low Income Group 
Bangladesh BGD Asia 
Benin BEN Africa 
China CRN Asia 
Egypt EGY Africa 
Ghana GHA Africa 
Honduras HND Central America 
Indja IND Asia 
Indonesia IDN Asia 
Kenya KEN Africa 
Lesotho LSO Africa 
Mali MLI Africa 
Nicaragua NIC Central America 
Nigeria NGA Africa J 
Pakistan PAK Asia 
Sri Lanka LKA Asia 
Middle Income 
Group 
Algeria DZA Africa 
Brazil BRA South America 
Chile CHL South America 
Ecuador ECU South America 
Gabon GAB Africa 
Jordan JOR Asia 
Korea KOR Asia 
Mexico MEX North America 
Peru PER South America 
Syria SYR Asia 
Thailand 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Turkey 
Uruguay 
THA 
TTO 
TUR 
URY 
Asia 
Central America 
Europe 
South America 
1 Country codes are based on Heston and Summers (1995). 
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Table 2. Parameter estimates of the growth equation from the pooled sample, 1970-90 
Variable OLS Fixed effect Random effect 
Constant -0.00124 0.06231 
(-2.511) (3.890) 
Govt -0.00015 -0.00454 -0.00158 
(-0.336) (-5.512) ( -2.955) 
Cad 0.00002 -0.00025 -0.00010 
(0.149) (-0.477) (-0.217) 
Extd 0.00095 -0.00003 0.00002 
(2.083) (-0.205) (0.139) 
Inv 0.00005 0.00210 0.00089 
(0.435) (2.591) (1.827) 
Opn -1.07380 0.00017 0.00006 
(-4.032) (0.624) (0.520) 
Pop -1.48420 -1.13338 
( -4.450) (-4.092) 
F-test 1.87 
LM test 0.05 
Wald test 28.48 
R2 0.06 0.14 0.06 
*Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-ratios for the corresponding coefficients. 
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Appendix 
Wagner's Law 
Consider an economy of two sectors, i.e., government and nongovernment sectors, 
respectively. The utility function for a representative consumer in this economy can be written as 
follows: 
U=U(G, NG) (AI) 
where G donates government produced goods and servIces and NG donates 
nongovernment produced goods and services. 
Max U=U(G, NG) (A2) 
Subject to: 
(A3) 
where I is the consumer income / 
PGdG+PNGdNG=dI (A4) 
(AS) 
PGG I dG PNGNG I dNG 
--x-x-+ x--x--=l 
I G dI I NG dI 
(A6) 
Let KG and KNG denote the share of government and nongovernment in consumer income, 
respectively. 
Let llG and llNG denote income elasticity of demand for government and nongovernment 
produced goods and services, respectively. Under the assumption of full employment, the income 
elasticity of demand for all goods and services produced in the economy is unity (Johnson, 
1973). Therefore, equation A6 can be written as follows: 
(A7) 
This equation implies that the weighted average of income elasticities is equal to 1. 
dKG 
Therefore, if 'lG )1,--)0 d1 
Baumol's Effect 
PG d(-G-) 
dKG = 1 
d1 d1 
dG 1 
PG-x--PG 
G d1 G G 
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(A8) 
(A9) 
(AIO) 
(All) 
(AI2) 
Let us consider an economy with two sectors, i.e., government sector and 
nongovernmentn sector. Figures Al and A2 represent the demand for and supply of government 
and nongovernment goods and services, respectively. Since the numeraires are chosen arbitrarily, 
If the income elasticity of demand for government produced goods "and services, i.e., llG, is 
greater than unity, the income elasticity of demand for nongovernment produced goods and 
services, i.e., llNG, should be less than unity. Therefore, if real per capita income increased, the 
DG will shift to the right more than DNG as portrayed in figures Al and A2, respectively. Given 
the assumption that the government sector is less capital intensive than the nongovernment one, 
the supply function for the former will shift to the right less than that of the latter as shown in 
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figures Al and A2, respectively. The net result will be an increase in the price of government 
produced goods and services from PG to PG1 and a decrease in the price of nongovernment 
produced goods and services from PNG to PNG 1. 
Proof· 
(A14) 
Let (j) and r denote the price of labor and capital, respectively, 
(AlS) 
(A16) 
Let ~ (i=L,K) denote the share of input i in producing a dollar worth of goods and services, 
/\ /\ /\ 
P G = BL ,G (j)+ BK ,G r (A17) 
/\ /\ /\ 
PN G = BL ,NG (j)+ BK,NG r (A18) 
As assumed in this hypothesis BL, G>BL,NG and BK, G <BK,NG 
/\ 
Assume now that r = 0, from equations A17 and A18 
(A19) 
But t{ G >- t{ NG , , (A20) 
From equation A19: 
/\ 
P 
_G_ >-1 
/\ (A2l) 
PNG 
